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Abstract: 
We present quantitative and qualitative evidence on the relative productivity of university 
technology transfer offices (TTOs). Our empirical results suggest that TTO activity is 
characterized by constant returns to scale and that environmental and institutional factors explain 
some of the variation in performance. Productivity may also depend on organizational practices. 
Unfortunately, there are no quantitative measures available on such practices, so we rely on 
inductive, qualitative methods to identify them. Based on 55 interviews of 98 entrepreneurs, 
scientists, and administrators at five research universities, we conclude that the most critical 
organizational factors are faculty reward systems, TTO staffing/compensation practices, and 
cultural barriers between universities and firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Universities in the United States have been criticized in some circles for being more adept at 
developing new technologies than moving them into private sector applications. This is 
potentially problematic since success in university/industry technology transfer (UITT) could be 
a critical factor in sustaining the global competitiveness of US firms. Some federal agencies have 
responded to this concern by providing incentives for universities to form partnerships with 
firms.1 Expectations regarding a quicker commercial “payoff” to basic research have risen 
accordingly. To build political support for their institutions, university leaders frequently cite the 
role of technology transfer in stimulating local economic development. Facing tighter budgets, 
these administrators often promise to deliver more “bang for the buck” in technology transfer. 
The private sector has also chimed in, expressing frustration with obstacles that impede the 
process of commercialization, such as disputes that arise with the university regarding 
intellectual property rights.2 
 
These concerns have raised the visibility of UITT in the public policy arena. In recent years, 
universities have attempted to formalize UITT and capture a larger share of the economic rents 
associated with technological innovation by establishing technology transfer offices (TTOs). 
TTOs facilitate technological diffusion through the licensing to industry of inventions or 
intellectual property resulting from university research.3 Many institutions established a TTO in 
the aftermath of the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, otherwise 
known as the Bayh–Dole Act. 
 
Bayh–Dole dramatically changed incentives for firms and universities to engage in UITT. It 
simplified the UITT process by instituting a uniform patent policy and removing many 
restrictions on licensing. Furthermore, it allowed universities to own the patents that arise from 
federal research grants. The framers of Bayh–Dole asserted that a streamlined federal UITT 
policy and university ownership and management of intellectual property would accelerate 
commercialization because universities would now have greater flexibility in negotiating 
licensing agreements and firms would be more willing to engage in them.4 
 
It appears that Bayh–Dole has indeed resulted in a more rapid rate of technological diffusion.5 
According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM, 1997), the annual 
number of patents granted to US universities surged from about 300 in 1980 to approximately 
2000 in 1996, while licensing of new technologies has increased almost two-fold since 1991. 
Annual streams of revenue accruing from these licenses have risen from about US$ 160 million 
in 1991 to US$ 611 million in 1997, now constituting about 2.5% of university R&D 
expenditures (GAO, 1998). Major products in a wide variety of industries have been developed 
through UITT, such as the Boyer–Cohen “gene-splicing” technique that launched the 
biotechnology industry, diagnostic tests for breast cancer and osteoporosis, internet search 
engines, music synthesizers, computer-aided design (CAD), and environmentally-friendly 
technologies. 
 
Despite the potential importance of UITT as a mechanism for generating local technological 
spillovers and as a source of revenue to the university, there is little systematic empirical 
evidence on any dimension of the performance or productivity of UITT activity.6 The purpose of 
this paper is to fill this void. 
 
Our measures of relative productivity are constructed from benchmarking surveys conducted by 
AUTM for the years 1991–1996. We adjust these estimates of relative efficiency to reflect 
environmental and institutional factors that can influence the rate of technological diffusion at a 
given university. We postulate that relative performance in UITT may also depend on 
organizational practices in university management of intellectual property, which potentially 
attenuate palpable differences in the motives, incentives, and organizational cultures of the 
parties to licensing agreements (university administrators/TTO directors, 
managers/entrepreneurs, and academic scientists). 
 
Unfortunately, there are no existing data on such practices, nor is it precisely clear which 
organizational factors are most critical to effectiveness in UITT. Therefore, we rely on inductive, 
qualitative methods (field research) to identify these variables, which are typically ignored in 
conventional productivity studies. The field research also provided a useful reality check on the 
specification of our econometric model. Accordingly, we conducted 55 structured, face-to-face 
interviews of UITT stakeholders (15 administrators, 20 managers or entrepreneurs, and 20 
scientists affiliated at five universities). We solicited feedback from these individuals on the 
nature of the UITT “production process”, barriers to effective UITT, recommendations to 
improve the process, and the importance of networks and relationships in UITT. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a set of internal and 
external factors that influence the extent of UITT at a given university. Differences in the 
actions, motives, and organizational environments of the parties to licensing agreements are also 
considered. We conjecture that these differences can potentially undermine efforts to 
commercialize university-based technologies. This discussion underscores the potential 
importance of organizational factors as a determinant of UITT performance. Section 3 outlines 
the method for assessing relative productivity in UITT. Empirical results are presented in Section 
4. Section 5 describes our qualitative research design and methods. Section 6 discusses our 
qualitative findings. The final section consists of preliminary conclusions and suggestions for 
additional research. 
 
2. Determinants of UITT 
2.1. Internal inputs 
To identify the appropriate “inputs”, we begin with a simple description of the process of the 
transfer of a technology from a university to a firm or entrepreneur, through the negotiation of a 
licensing agreement. This description reflects the conventional wisdom among academic 
administrators (see AUTM, 1997) regarding how technologies are transferred. It is important to 
note that this linear model does not necessarily constitute an accurate representation of how all 
technologies are actually transferred. Indeed, a key goal of our field research is to determine 
whether this model understates the complexity of this process. 
 
The first stage of the process is scientific discovery. The Bayh–Dole Act stipulates that scientists 
must then file an invention disclosure with the TTO. Our field research, which is described in 
greater detail in 5 and 6, revealed that this rule is rarely enforced. Thus, TTO personnel must 
devote some effort to encouraging faculty members to disclose inventions. Once the invention is 
formally disclosed, the TTO simultaneously evaluates the commercial potential of the 
technology and decides whether to patent the innovation. Often, interest in the technology by an 
industry partner provides sufficient justification for filing a patent. In other instances, the TTO 
must make these judgements before industry expresses an interest in the technology. 
Furthermore, universities must decide whether to seek global or domestic patent protection. 
Domestic protection is substantially cheaper, but often much less valuable to potential licensees, 
particularly when foreign markets are perceived to be highly lucrative relative to the US market. 
As confirmed in our interviews, this decision poses a dilemma for many TTOs because they have 
limited resources for filing patents. 
 
If the patent is awarded, the TTO will often attempt to market the technology. Faculty members 
are frequently involved in the marketing phase because they are usually in a good position to 
identify potential licensees and because their technical expertise often makes them a natural 
partner for firms that wish to commercialize the technology. It is important to note that the linear 
model potentially overstates the role of patents in UITT. As reported in Jensen and Thursby 
(2001) and confirmed in our field research, many firms will license a technology before it is 
patented.7 This implies that a key input of UITT is invention disclosures, which constitute the 
pool of available technologies for licensing. 
 
The final stages of UITT involve the negotiation of a licensing agreement with firms or 
individual entrepreneurs. These agreements could include such benefits to the university as 
royalties, “follow-on” sponsored research agreements, or an equity stake in a new venture based 
on the licensed technology. We discovered on our field visits that many universities, especially 
public institutions, are quite sensitive to the charge that they are “giving away” university-based, 
taxpayer-funded technologies that yield substantial windfall profits. As a result, many TTOs are 
adopting a hard line in licensing negotiations. 
 
Interviews with university administrators revealed that TTO involvement does not end with the 
signing of a licensing agreement. It is quite common for TTOs to devote substantial resources to 
the maintenance and re-negotiation of licensing agreements. This is attributed both to the 
embryonic nature of the technologies and to the fledgling nature of many of the firms that license 
university-based technologies. 
 
We wish to stress that our field research greatly improved our ability to model the “production 
process” of UITT, by helping us identify the appropriate set of outputs and inputs to include in 
the production function. For instance, we began this project with the view that there are multiple 
outputs of UITT. Discussions with university administrators, the “producers” in our model, 
revealed that licensing activity is by far the most critical output, so we now focus our attention 
on this critical dimension of UITT performance. Our qualitative work also revealed that we had 
greatly underestimated the importance of faculty “buy-in” to UITT. This stemmed, in part, from 
our literal interpretation of the language contained in the Bayh–Dole Act, which stipulates that 
academics working on federal research grants must disclose their inventions to the TTO. 
However, we discovered that this provision is rarely enforced, so that disclosure is actually not 
mandatory. 
 
Thus, invention disclosures are the key intermediate input. The number of disclosures will 
depend, to some extent, on the efforts of the TTO to elicit them (and faculty interest in UITT). 
This, of course, raises the critical issue of organizational incentives for faculty and TTO 
personnel to engage in these activities. Consistent with recent theoretical and empirical studies 
summarized in Lazear (1999), we hypothesize that human resource management and other 
organizational practices that influence such incentives could explain some of the variation in 
UITT performance across universities. 
 
Our initial field research also demonstrated the importance of intellectual property attorneys in 
UITT. Some universities use these lawyers to help them obtain copyrights and in various aspects 
of patenting and licensing, especially in support of prosecution, maintenance, litigation and 
interference. At some institutions, external attorneys are also involved in negotiation and re-
negotiation of licensing agreements. Thus, expenditure of external lawyers should also be viewed 
as an input to UITT. 
 
In sum, we conjecture that the following internal factors are inputs of UITT: invention 
disclosures (a proxy for the set of available technologies), labor employed by the TTO, and 
(external) legal fees incurred to protect the university’s intellectual property.8 That is, we have 
specified a TTO “production function” where the relevant inputs are assumed to be under the 
control of the “producer” or the TTO director. 
 
We also seek to explain deviations from the production frontier, which are presumed to be a 
function of a set of environmental and institutional variables, which are outside of the control of 
the TTO director. These variables are not conventional inputs (i.e. resources under the direct 
control of the producer), but rather external factors that could enhance or reduce the rate at which 
universities transfer technologies to the private sector. We conjecture that organizational 
practices (as yet undefined) could also constitute determinants of inefficiency. In the following 
subsections, we discuss these factors. 
 
2.2. Environmental/institutional factors 
University licensing activity may also depend on a vector of environmental and institutional 
variables. For instance, the presence of a medical school and the public status of the university 
may be important institutional factors. Pressman et al. (1995) report that over 60% of university 
licenses result from a biomedical invention. Public universities may have less flexible UITT 
policies than private universities regarding startup companies and interactions with private firms. 
Furthermore, public universities may be less focused on UITT as a source of revenue than 
private universities. The age of the TTO may also be relevant, as universities with more 
experience in formal management of UITT may be efficient than comparable universities with 
less experience. An example of an environmental variable is state-level economic growth, which 
can be viewed as a proxy for the ability of firms in the local region to sponsor R&D at the 
university. 
 
In explaining the relative efficiency of TTOs, it may also be important to control for the R&D 
activity of local firms. A plethora of recent studies provide support for the notion that university 
research generates local technological spillovers. Bania et al. (1993) find that there is a positive 
relationship between university R&D and the number of firm startups in the same SMSA. Jaffe 
et al. (1993) report that patents (new technologies) generated within the same state (and SMSA) 
are more likely to be cited by firms in the same state or SMSA. Zucker et al. (1998) and 
Audretsch and Stephan (1996) directly examine interactions between academic scientists and 
local firms and find that these formal and informal linkages play an important role in promoting 
innovation in biotechnology. 
 
2.3. Organizational factors 
An understanding of the potential importance of organizational practices begins with a 
consideration of the actions, motives, and organizational cultures of UITT stakeholders. As 
shown in Table 1, we conjecture that a primary motive of university scientists is recognition 
within the scientific community, which emanates from publications in top-tier journals, 
presentations at prestigious conferences, and federal research grants. This is an especially strong 
motive for untenured faculty members. Other possible motives include financial gain and a 
desire to secure additional funding for graduate assistants, post-doctoral fellows, and laboratory 
equipment/facilities. The norms, standards, and values of scientists reflect an organizational 
culture that values creativity, innovation, and especially, an individual’s contribution to advances 
in knowledge (basic research). 
Table 1. Characteristics of UITT stakeholders 
Stakeholder Actions Primary motive(s) Secondary motive(s) Organizational 
culture 
University 
scientist 
Discovery of new 
knowledge 
Recognition within 
the scientific 
community 
Financial gain and a 
desire to secure 
additional research 
funding 
Scientific 
TTO Works with faculty and 
firms/entrepreneurs to 
structure deal 
Protect and market 
the university’s 
intellectual 
property 
Facilitate technological 
diffusion and secure 
additional research 
funding 
Bureaucratic 
Firm/entrepreneur Commercializes new 
technology 
Financial gain Maintain control of 
proprietary 
technologies 
Entrepreneurial 
 
The TTO must work with scientists and managers or entrepreneurs to structure a deal. We 
hypothesize that the primary motive of the TTO is to protect and market the university’s 
intellectual property. Secondary motives include promoting technological diffusion and securing 
additional research funding for the university via royalties, licensing fees, and sponsored 
research agreements. Recall that a primary reason for the federal government’s relinquishment of 
intellectual property rights, as stipulated in Bayh–Dole, was to accelerate the commercialization 
of university-based technologies. Many managers and scientists remarked that TTOs were 
especially committed to their role as guardian of the university’s intellectual property. As such, 
technology licensing officers tend to be somewhat inflexible and conservative in structuring 
deals. This inflexibility is consistent with the bureaucratic organizational culture of the 
university. 
 
Firms and entrepreneurs seek to commercialize university-based technologies for financial gain. 
They also wish to maintain proprietary control over these technologies, which can potentially be 
achieved via an exclusive worldwide license. The entrepreneurial organizational culture of most 
firms (especially startups) rewards timeliness, speed, and flexibility. Reflecting these cultural 
values, many managers we visited stressed the importance of “time to market” as a determinant 
of success in UITT, in part, because they are convinced that there are significant first mover 
advantages in high technology markets. 
 
Table 1 reveals that there are palpable differences in the motives, incentives, and organizational 
cultures of UITT stakeholders that can potentially impede technological diffusion. Thus, we 
hypothesize that some of the variation in UITT performance across universities can be attributed 
to organizational behaviors that potentially serve to resolve these differences. Our inductive, 
qualitative analysis, described in 5 and 6, will help us identify these factors. 
 
3. Assessing relative productivity in UITT 
In the previous section, we identified a set of potential determinants of UITT, which include 
internal inputs, environmental and institutional factors, and a set of organizational variables. To 
assess relative productivity in UITT, we use the stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) method 
developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). SFE generates a 
production (or cost) frontier with a stochastic error term that consists of two components: a 
conventional random error (“white noise”) and a term that represents deviations from the 
frontier, or relative inefficiency. 
 
SFE can be contrasted with data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric estimation 
technique that has been used extensively to compute relative productivity in service industries 
(Charnes et al., 1994). Thursby and Kemp (1998) use DEA to assess the relative efficiency of 
TTOs. DEA and SFE each have key strengths and weaknesses. DEA is a mathematical 
programming approach that does not require the specification of a functional form for the 
production function. It can also cope more readily with multiple inputs and outputs than 
parametric methods. However, DEA models are deterministic and highly sensitive to outliers. 
SFE allows for statistical inference, but requires restrictive functional form and distributional 
assumptions. We believe that SFE and DEA are complements, not substitutes. 
In SFE, a production function of the following form is estimated: 
equation(1) 
 
where the subscript i denotes the ith university, y the output, X the vector of inputs, β the 
unknown parameter vector, and ε is an error term with two components, εi=Vi−Ui, 
where Ui represents a non-negative error term to account for technical inefficiency, or failure to 
produce maximal output, given the set of inputs used, and Vi is a symmetric error term that 
accounts for random effects. The standard assumption (see Aigner et al., 1977) is that 
the Ui and Vi have the following distributions: 
 
 
That is, the inefficiency term (Ui) is assumed to have a half-normal distribution, i.e. universities 
are either “on the frontier” or below it. An important parameter in this model is γ=σu2/(σ
v2+σu2), the ratio of the standard error of technical inefficiency to the standard error of 
statistical noise, which is bounded between 0 and 1. Note that γ=0 under the null hypothesis of 
an absence of inefficiency, signifying that all of the variance can be attributed to statistical noise. 
In recent years, SFE models have been developed that allow the technical inefficiency term to be 
expressed as a function of a vector of environmental and organizational variables. This is 
consistent with our notion that deviations from the frontier (which measure relative inefficiency 
in UITT) are related to institutional and organizational factors. Following Reifschneider and 
Stevenson (1991), we assume that the Ui are independently distributed as truncations at zero of 
the N(mi,σu2) distribution with 
equation(2) 
 
where Z is a vector of environmental, institutional, and organizational variables that are 
hypothesized to influence efficiency and δ is a parameter vector.9 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), we derive maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter 
vectors β andδ from simultaneous estimation of the production function and inefficiency term 
equations, using the FRONTIER statistical package (Coelli, 1994). Based on these parameter 
values, we compute estimates of relative productivity. 
Our specification of Eq. (1) is based on the knowledge production function framework developed 
by Griliches (1979), here extended to university licensing, our proxy for UITT output. We 
assume a three-factor, log-linear Cobb–Douglas production function, relating licensing to three 
inputs: invention disclosures, TTO staff, and legal expenditures: 
equation(3) 
 
where LICENSE is the average annual licensing agreements or revenue, INVDISC the average 
annual invention disclosures, STAFF the average annual TTO employees, and LEGAL denotes 
the average annual external legal expenditures with the technical inefficiency (Ui) term 
expressed as: 
equation(4) 
 
where ENV and ORG are vectors of environmental and organizational factors, respectively, 
and μ is a classical disturbance term. As previously noted, we do not have any systematic 
measures of ORG. Nor is it clear from the literature precisely what organizational factors should 
be measured, even if we had the ability to do so. Thus, the equation we estimate contains only 
the following environmental/institutional (ENV) factors: 
equation(4a) 
 
where MED and PUBLIC are dummies denoting whether the university has a medical school and 
whether it is a public institution, respectively, AGE is the age of the TTO, and INDRD and 
INDOUT are average annual industry R&D intensity and average annual real output growth in 
the university’s state (j), respectively, during the sample period.10 
The characteristics of our data and parameter estimates of (3) and (4a) are presented in the 
following section. 
 
4. Data and empirical results 
Our primary data source is a comprehensive survey conducted by AUTM, which was completed 
by TTO directors at 183 academic institutions for 1991–1996. After eliminating teaching 
hospitals, research institutes, and Canadian institutions, we have 113 US universities. Our final 
sample contains 80 out of 89 US “Research 1” institutions.11 
 
The AUTM file contains annual data on the number of licensing agreements (LICENSE1), 
royalty income generated by licenses (LICENSE2), invention disclosures (INVDISC), number of 
full-time-equivalent employees in the TTO (STAFF), and (external) legal expenditures on UITT 
(LEGAL).12 Our data sources for state-level industrial R&D (INDRD) and real output growth 
(INDOUT) are NSF and the BEA.13 
 
There are several difficulties with the output data. First, licensing agreements vary substantially 
in their significance, making it dangerous to draw inferences about aggregate technology flows 
based on the number of deals.14 To address this concern, we use licensing revenue as an 
additional measure of output. Another limitation is that we focus only on two UITT outputs: 
licensing agreements and royalties. Sponsored research and the formation of startups can also be 
viewed as UITT outputs. However, startups and sponsored research agreements are often a direct 
result of licensing agreements. Similarly, one could adopt a broad view of technology transfer 
and treat patents, invention disclosures, and even students as UITT outputs. Given the 
uncertainty surrounding this issue, we asked UITT stakeholders to identify the outputs of UITT 
in our field research. 
 
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the inputs and outputs of the licensing 
production function are presented in Table 2. The average university in our sample generates 14 
licensing agreements per year, earns US$ 1.8 million in licensing income, receives 54 invention 
disclosures, employs nine workers in the TTO, and spends US$ 353,000 on external legal fees to 
protect its intellectual property. The correlation coefficients generally have the expected signs 
and magnitudes (e.g. invention disclosures are strongly positively correlated with the number of 
licensing agreements and revenue). 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for inputs and outputs of the stochastic 
frontier production function (Eq. (3)) 
Variable 
name 
Description Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
 
LICENSE1 Average annual licensing agreements 14.3 8 21.4  
LICENSE2 Average annual licensing revenue (US$ 
000) 
1803.7 321 4997.4  
INVDISC Average annual invention disclosures 53.9 24 67.4  
STAFF Average annual TTO employees 9.1 5 16.1  
LEGAL Average annual external legal expenditures 
on UITT (000) 
352.6 129.8 640.1  
 
Variable 
name 
 
LICENSE1 
 
LICENSE2 
 
INVDISC 
 
STAFF 
 
LEGAL 
Correlation coefficients 
LICENSE1 1.00 0.89 0.66 0.47 −0.39 
LICENSE2 0.89 1.00 0.68 −0.03 0.57 
INVDISC 0.66 0.68 1.00 0.43 0.48 
STAFF 0.47 −0.03 0.43 1.00 0.49 
LEGAL −0.39 0.57 0.48 0.49 1.00 
N=113 universities, 1991–1996; source: AUTM (1997). 
Note that each variable is computed as an annual average over the sample period. Although it 
may be desirable econometrically to construct a panel consisting of annual observations, this 
approach is problematic for two reasons. First, the use of annual data or lagged values to estimate 
the production function would result in an unbalanced panel, since all universities are not 
continuous reporters during the sample period. A related concern is that it is desirable to have a 
large sample of establishments when fitting the production function, given that the precision of 
this estimation will be highly dependent on the number of establishments used to project the 
frontier. Computing annual averages over the sample period yields the largest possible number of 
universities for the econometric estimation. 
 
Table 3 contains two sets of parameter estimates of the stochastic frontier production function 
and inefficiency models outlined in the previous section ((3) and (4a)) for two dependent 
variables: average annual number of licensing agreements and average annual licensing 
revenues, respectively.15 Columns 1 and 4 present OLS results, which are used to obtain starting 
values for regression parameters in the SFE model.16 Columns 2 and 5 contain maximum 
likelihood estimates of the SFE model without the environmental and institutional variables, 
while columns 3 and 6 present the coefficients of the “full” version of the SFE model, including 
the inefficiency model with environmental and institutional variables. 
 
 
Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates of the stochastic frontier and inefficiency models 
((3) and (4a)) 
 Dependent variable 
 Average annual number of licensing 
agreements 
Average annual licensing revenue 
 OLS (1) SFE1 (2) SFE2 (3) OLS (4) SFE1 (5) SFE2 (6) 
Stochastic frontier 
 Intercept −0.363a(0
.172) 
−0.218a(0
.108) 
−0.297a(0
.146) 
2.210b(0.
598) 
1.948b(0.
902) 
1.501b(0.
739) 
 INVDISC 0.669b(0.
094) 
0.657b(0.
096) 
0.649b(0.
087) 
1.295b(0.
281) 
1.386b(0.
349) 
1.316b(0.
510) 
 STAFF 0.445b(0.
087) 
0.395b(0.
119) 
0.379b(0.
095) 
−0.219 
(0.343) 
−0.206 
(0.371) 
−0.198 
(0.299) 
 LEGAL −0.061a(0
.028) 
−0.060a(0
.028) 
−0.038a(0
.018) 
0.526b(0.
110) 
0.463b(0.
129) 
0.412b(0.
145) 
 
Inefficiency model 
      
 MED   0.136 
(0.270) 
  −0.011 
(0.126) 
       PUBLIC   0.012 
(0.035) 
  0.050 
(0.067) 
       AGE   −0.103 
(0.189) 
  −0.115a(0
.052) 
       INDRD   −0.125a(0
.060) 
  −0.093 
(0.071) 
       INDOUT   −0.044 
(0.057) 
  −0.052 
(0.083) 
       R2 0.822   0.752   
       F statistic 
for β1 + β2
+ β3 = 1 
1.21   9.95b   
      
 log 
likelihood 
 −20.79 −19.76  −22.61 −21.41 
       γ=σu2/(σv2
+σu2) 
 0.775b(0.
173) 
0.651b(0.
259) 
 816b(0.3
11) 
0.716b(0.
268) 
       Mean 
technical 
efficiency 
 0.77 0.83  0.76 0.80 
      Notes: standard errors in parentheses; N=113 universities; SFE1 denotes stochastic frontier 
estimation excluding environmental/institutional determinants of inefficiency; SFE2 denotes 
stochastic frontier estimation including environmental/institutional determinants of inefficiency. 
a Significant at the 5% level. 
b Significant at the 1% level. 
The production function model appears to fit quite well, based on the R2 values (0.82 and 0.75 
for agreements and revenue, respectively). Across all variants, the estimated elasticity of 
licensing output with respect to invention disclosures is positive and highly significant. It appears 
that hiring additional TTO staff results in more agreements (columns 1–3), but not additional 
revenue (columns 4–6). This finding suggests that university administrators have established 
TTO incentives in a manner that is consistent with the spirit of Bayh–Dole, i.e. to maximize the 
number of licensing agreements. 
 
On the other hand, the results imply that spending more on (external) lawyers reduces the 
number of licensing agreements, but increases licensing revenue. This finding is consistent with 
the feedback we received from firms in our field research. Several managers reported that it was 
much more difficult to negotiate with outside attorneys than university administrators, because 
the lawyers tended to adopt a tougher negotiation stance. Other managers viewed a university’s 
liberal use of outside lawyers as a signal that the institution would be aggressive in exercising its 
intellectual property rights. 
 
It is difficult to assess the validity of these hypotheses without additional information on the 
composition of the TTO staff, as substantial external legal expense could actually reflect 
outsourcing of legal functions or defensive actions in the aftermath of a major lawsuit. Moreover, 
there could be reverse causality at play, i.e. universities with more lucrative inventions, or those 
who focus on particularly contentious fields, may be more likely to use outside counsel to protect 
their intellectual property.17 These interpretations imply that it is not the actions of lawyers that 
generate higher licensing revenue. 
 
F statistics presented in Table 3 imply that licensing revenue is subject to increasing returns, 
while licensing agreements are characterized by constant returns to scale. The latter result is 
consistent with Adams and Griliches (1998), who examined the research productivity of 
universities (using papers and citations as outputs and R&D expenditures as inputs) and found 
evidence of constant returns to scale. An implication of increasing returns for licensing revenue 
is that a university wishing to maximize revenue should spend more on lawyers. Perhaps this 
would free up TTO staff to spend more time “matching” scientists to firms. Still, this result 
should be interpreted with caution, as licensing revenue, even when computed over a six-year 
period, can be a somewhat misleading indicator of current TTO performance, as royalty streams 
may reflect transactions that were consummated many years ago. For instance, the University of 
Florida has consistently ranked among the top 10 US universities in licensing income due to 
Gatorade. 
 
Next, we focus on parameter estimates of the “full” SFE model (SFE2), including the 
inefficiency equation (Eq. (4a)). In general, the coefficients on the environmental and 
institutional variables have the right signs, but are statistically insignificant. However, the 
licensing agreement equation (column 3) results indicate that universities in states with higher 
levels of industrial R&D activity (INDRD) are less inefficient, that is closer to the frontier. This 
finding implies that there is a positive association between R&D conducted by local firms and 
UITT productivity at universities in the same state. In the licensing agreement equation (column 
6), we find that older TTOs tend to be closer to the frontier, implying that there is a learning 
effect in university management of intellectual property. Our results are consistent with evidence 
presented in Mowery et al. (2001), which reports that over time, newer TTOs learn how to raise 
the quality of their patent portfolios. 
 
Despite the lack of significance of most of the coefficients, the γ values are highly statistically 
significant, indicating that the (null) hypothesis that inefficiency effects are absent from the 
model can be decisively rejected in each instance. Further evidence that external factors provide 
some explanatory power is shown in Table 3, which contrasts the mean technical efficiency in 
versions of the model excluding (columns 2 and 5) and including (columns 4 and 6) the 
environmental and institutional variables. The latter set of findings indicate that these external 
factors explain some of the variation in technical inefficiency across universities, 26.1 and 
16.7%, respectively.18 
 
In this section, we specified a TTO “production function” where the outputs are the number of 
licensing agreements (LICENSE1) and licensing revenue (LICENSE2) and the inputs are 
invention disclosures (INVDISC), employees in the TTO (STAFF), and (external) legal 
expenditures (LEGAL). These variables are assumed to be under the control of the “producer” or 
the TTO director. We also attempted to explain deviations from the production frontier (relative 
inefficiency), which are assumed to be a function of a set of environmental and institutional 
variables that are outside of the control of the TTO director. These are external factors that could 
enhance or reduce the rate at which universities transfer technologies to the private sector. Our 
econometric results suggest that while the TTO production function fits well, deviations from the 
production frontier cannot be completely explained by environmental and institutional factors. 
 
As previously noted, we conjecture that some of the variation in relative productivity can also be 
attributed to organizational practices in university management of intellectual property. These 
practices could potentially serve to mitigate conflict caused by palpable differences in the 
motives, incentives, and organizational cultures of scientists, firms, and administrators. 
Unfortunately, there are no existing data on UITT organizational practices, nor is it even 
precisely clear what needs to be measured. 
 
Accordingly, we outline our inductive, qualitative approach to the examination of organizational 
issues in the following section. We also provide detailed description of our qualitative research 
methods, as most economists are unfamiliar with these techniques. This information may be 
beneficial to economists who are contemplating fieldwork. 
 
5. Qualitative research methods 
Researchers conducting interview-based, field studies confront four methodological issues: 
sample selection, the nature of the interview questions, procedures for conducting interviews, 
and qualitative data analysis. Table 4 summarizes how we dealt with these issues.19 In doing so, 
we borrow heavily from the fields of management and sociology, where such methods are 
prevalent. We now briefly consider each of these issues in turn. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Four key methodological issues in a field study and how we addressed them 
Sample selection Nature of interview 
questions 
Procedures for 
conducting interviews 
Qualitative data 
analysis 
Convenience sample of five 
universities from two regions 
Semi-structured (some 
questions were the 
same for each group, 
some were tailored to a 
particular group) 
Face-to-face interviews Tape recording and 
transcription of 
interviews by neutral 
third party 
Stratified approach to the selection of 
interviewees: managers/entrepreneurs, 
university administrators, university 
scientists 
Open-ended questions Team approach Identification of 
themes from 
transcripts by 
multiple assessors 
  Neutral probing Coding of themes 
  Pledge of confidentiality Frequency tables 
displaying important 
themes 
  Interviewees had prior 
knowledge of the goals of 
the study and 
backgrounds of the 
researchers 
Z tests comparing 
proportion of 
responses between 
stakeholder groups 
 
We interviewed TTO stakeholders at five US universities in the southwest and southeast. This is 
a convenience sample, due to our familiarity with these institutions and the surrounding regions. 
Yin (1989) reports that convenience samples are common in inductive, exploratory studies, 
especially when researchers have limited funding. Although our approach precludes an 
examination of such hotbeds of UITT activity as Cambridge (MIT, Harvard) or Silicon Valley 
(Stanford, UC-Berkeley), the schools we visited are probably far more representative of the 
modal university experience with UITT. 
 
The top panel of Table 5 presents some information on the five universities in our field study. 
These include private and public universities, land grant institutions, and universities with and 
without a medical school. There is also considerable variation with respect to size and age of the 
TTO, extent of licensing activity, and technical efficiency.20 The bottom panel of Table 5 
compares mean values of licensing agreements, licensing revenue, TTO staff and age, and 
technical efficiency for the five institutions we visited and the 113 universities in our 
econometric analysis. Although these five schools generate below average licensing revenue, 
they are quite similar to the average AUTM respondent along the other dimensions. These 
findings lend further credence to our assertion that the universities in our field study are 
representative institutions with respect to UITT. 
Table 5. Characteristics of the five universities in our field study and comparison of mean values 
of key variables with full statistical sample of 113 universities 
 University A University B University C University 
D 
University 
E 
Organizational 
status 
Private Public Public Public Public 
Medical school Yes Yes No No Yes 
Land grant 
institution 
No No Yes No Yes 
TTO 
established in 
1984 1985 1982 1985 1988 
STAFF 14.2 11.5 11.1 2.9 8.5 
LICENSE1 28.1 19.0 26.1 3.4 12.0 
LICENSE2 1213.2 773.3 1535.7 382.7 177.0 
Technical 
efficiency 
84.1 80.2 87.8 71.3 74.8 
 
Variable name 
 
Description 
 
Five universities 
in our field 
study 
 
One-hundred and 
thirteen universities in 
our statistical sample 
  
Mean values of key variables 
LICENSE1 Average annual 
licensing agreements 
17.7 14.3   
LICENSE2 Average annual 
licensing revenue 
(US$ 000) 
816.4 1803.7   
STAFF Average annual TTO 
employees 
9.6 9.1   
AGE Numbers of years 
since TTO was 
established (as of 
1996) 
11.1 12.5   
Technical 
efficiency 
Estimate of relative 
productivity based on 
SFE 
79.6 76.9 
   
We constructed a stratified sample of interviewees, drawn from each stakeholder group. At each 
university, we interviewed academic scientists, TTO directors, and top-level research 
administrators. Within the surrounding region, we also met with entrepreneurs, directors of 
business development, intellectual property managers and other research executives of large 
companies, and executives of patent management firms and non-profit organizations with an 
interest in UITT. All in all, we conducted 55 interviews: 20 managers and entrepreneurs, 15 
administrators (including the five TTO directors), and 20 scientists.21 
 
Potential respondents were selected in two ways. First, we identified the TTO director and other 
administrators with UITT responsibilities, such as a Vice Provost, Vice President, or Vice 
Chancellor for Research.22 Second, to identify managers/entrepreneurs and scientists, we 
solicited feedback from two non-partisan, non-profit organizations that serve as UITT facilitators 
in each region. These facilitators helped us select managers and scientists with different 
perspectives on UITT.23 
 
In formulating our set of questions, we adopted a “semi-structured” approach (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), whereby interviewees within each stakeholder category were asked the same 
questions. According to these authors, the best approach for an inductive study is to ask open-
ended questions, such as “what are the outputs of UITT?”, “what are the barriers to effective 
UITT?”, and “how would you improve the process?” We asked such questions to all 
stakeholders, although some queries were tailored to a particular group. For example, TTO 
directors were asked about TTO managerial practices, while administrators were asked broader 
questions regarding strategic goals for UITT. 
 
Following Sekaran (1992), we conducted face-to-face interviews, which the author contends is 
the best approach for an inductive study on a controversial topic. We paired economists with 
management professors, as management professors have much more extensive experience and 
training in qualitative methods.24 The use of teams can also enhance the overall effectiveness of 
a face-to-face interview by increasing the likelihood that a researcher can respond to a clarifying 
question or establish a rapport with the interviewee. We also employed three tactics (see 
Waldman et al., 1998) that increase the accuracy of qualitative data: neutral probing of answers, 
a pledge of confidentiality, and prior knowledge of the goals of the study and backgrounds of the 
researchers.25 
 
Based on the 55 transcripts, we implemented the three stages of qualitative analysis of interview 
data outlined in Miles and Huberman (1994): data reduction, data display, and conclusion 
drawing/verification (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 10–12). Data reduction involves the 
selection, simplification, and transformation of raw data (interview responses) into an analyzable 
form. First, we developed a list of general categories for content analysis. These categories were 
based on general research questions, such as identifying the barriers to UITT.26 Next, for each 
transcript, all comments were independently categorized by at least two members of the research 
team into four areas: UITT outputs, networks/relationships in UITT, barriers to UITT, and 
proposed improvements to the UITT process. Researchers’ lists of comments within a topic area 
were then compared and discrepancies discussed, until agreement was reached regarding 
comments that were pertinent to each category.27 
 
Following identification of relevant comments in each topic area, each researcher then worked 
with five interview transcripts to generate a list of more specific themes within the four 
categories. The research team then met and discussed the themes that emerged. There was a great 
deal of similarity in the lists of themes that emerged from the separate samples of comments. 
After a consensus was reached regarding the themes, we returned to the lists of comments 
pertinent to each of the four general categories and sorted them into the themes identified for that 
respective category. For data display purposes, we tabulated frequency counts for each major 
theme that emerged. 
 
In Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9, we display percentages of respondents who identified a 
particular theme relating to UITT outputs, relationships/networks, barriers to effective UITT, and 
suggested improvements to the UITT process. For example, the first column on Table 6 reveals 
that 75% of the managers/entrepreneurs we interviewed identified licenses as an output of UITT. 
Note that these analyses are conducted separately for each stakeholder group. Proportion tests of 
differences (Z tests) were computed to compare whether the proportion of respondents 
mentioning a theme in a given group differs from the proportion of respondents mentioning a 
theme in another group. For instance, Z12 compares managers/entrepreneurs (Group 1) and TTO 
directors/university administrators (Group 2). 
 
 
Table 6. Outputs of UITT as identified by interviewees in our field study 
Outputs Type of interviewee Z12 Z13 Z23 
 Managers/entrepreneurs 
(1) 
TTO 
directors/administrators 
(2) 
University 
scientists (3) 
   
Licenses 75.0 86.7 25.0 −1.37 2.14** 3.24* 
Royalties 30.0 66.7 15.0 −1.74 0.91 2.61* 
Patents 10.0 46.7 20.0 −2.91* −0.84 2.23** 
Sponsored 
research 
agreements 
5.0 46.7 0.0 −2.72* 0.44 3.33* 
Startup 
companies 
5.0 33.3 10.0 −2.07** −0.56 1.64 
Invention 
disclosures 
5.0 33.3 5.0 −2.81* −0.99 2.28* 
Students 25.0 26.7 15.0 −0.22 0.88 1.22 
Informal 
transfer of 
know-how 
70.0 20.0 20.0 2.69* 3.31* 0.03 
Product 
development 
40.0 6.7 35.0 2.08** 0.12 −2.01** 
Economic 
development 
35.0 20.0 0.0 0.52 2.98* 2.03** 
Number of 
interviews 
20 15 20    
Note: the values presented in columns 1–3 are the percentages of respondents who identified a 
particular item as an output of UITT. The values displayed in the last three columns 
are Z statistics for differences in proportions between each class of interviewee. 
** P<0.05. 
* P<0.01. 
 
 
Table 7. Aspects of relationships/networks in UITT as identified by interviewees in our field 
study 
Relationships/net
works 
Type of interviewee Z12 Z13 Z23 
 Managers/entrepre
neurs (1) 
TTO 
directors/administr
ators (2) 
Univers
ity 
scientist
s (3) 
   
Personal 
relationships 
75.0 66.7 80.0 0.68 −0.4
2 
−1.6
3 
TTO as a 
facilitator of 
relationships 
between scientists 
and firms 
25.0 75.0 40.0 −2.65
* 
−0.9
1 
1.92 
Knowledge 
transfer from 
industry to faculty 
members 
25.0 20.0 65.0 0.35 −2.4
6* 
−29
7* 
Conference/expos/
town hall 
meetings on TT 
issues 
35.0 80.0 15.0 −2.34
** 
1.59 3.56
* 
Contractual 
relationships 
15.0 6.7 0.0 0.84 1.80 1.02 
Number of 
interviews 
20 15 20    
Note: the values presented in columns 1–3 are the percentages of respondents who identified a 
particular item as an aspect of relationships/networks in UITT. The values displayed in the last 
three columns are Z statistics for differences in proportions between each class of interviewee. 
** P<0.05. 
* P<0.01. 
 
Table 8. Barriers to UITT as identified by interviewees in our field study 
Barriers Type of interviewee Z12 Z13 Z23 
 Managers/entreprene
urs (1) 
TTO 
directors/administrat
ors (2) 
Universit
y 
scientists 
(3) 
   
Lack of understanding 
regarding university, 
corporate, or scientific 
norms and environments 
90.0 93.3 75.0 −0.2
5 
1.19 1.30 
Insufficient rewards for 
university researchers 
35.0 60.0 70.0 −1.2
9 
−2.46
* 
−1.03 
Bureaucracy and 
inflexibility of university 
administrators 
80.0 6.7 70.0 3.96* 0.74 −3.51
* 
Insufficient resources 
devoted to technology 
transfer by universities 
35.0 53.3 20.0 −0.9
5 
0.93 2.05** 
Poor 
marketing/technical/negotiat
ion skills of TTOs 
55.0 13.3 25.0 2.07*
* 
1.91 −0.71 
University too aggressive in 
exercising intellectual 
property rights 
80.0 13.3 25.0 3.30* 2.94* −0.91 
Faculty 
members/administrators 
have unrealistic expectations 
regarding the value of their 
technologies 
25.0 40.0 10.0 −0.9
4 
1.13 1.90 
“Public domain” mentality 
of universities 
40.0 6.7 5.0 1.86 2.60* 0.38 
Number of interviews 20 15 20    
Note: the values presented in columns 1–3 are the percentages of respondents who identified a 
particular item as a barrier to UITT. The values displayed in the last three columns 
are Z statistics for differences in proportions between each class of interviewee. 
** P<0.05. 
* P<0.01. 
Table 9. Suggested improvements to the UITT process, as identified by interviewees in our field 
study 
Improvement
s 
Type of interviewee Z12 Z13 Z23 
 Managers/entrepreneur
s (1) 
TTO 
directors/administrator
s (2) 
Universit
y 
scientists 
(3) 
   
Universities 
and industry 
should devote 
more effort to 
developing 
better mutual 
understanding 
80.0 93.3 75.0 −0.9
6 
0.33 1.28 
Modify 
reward 
systems to 
reward 
technology 
transfer 
activities 
85.0 80.0 80.0 0.35 0.36 −0.0
0 
Universities 
need to 
provide more 
education to 
overcome 
informational 
and cultural 
barriers 
85.0 86.7 60.0 −0.0
9 
1.70 1.74 
Universities 
should devote 
additional 
resources to 
technology 
transfer 
45.0 46.7 60.0 0.11 −1.0
0 
−1.2
5 
Universities 
should be less 
aggressive in 
exercising 
intellectual 
55.0 10.0 15.0 2.52* 2.62* −0.3
6 
property 
rights 
Increase 
formal and 
informal 
networking 
between 
scientists and 
practitioners 
35.0 26.7 40.0 0.65 −0.3
4 
−1.0
9 
Universities 
need greater 
technical 
expertise and 
marketing 
skills in the 
TTO 
50.0 20.0 25.0 1.76 1.54 −0.3
7 
Number of 
interviews 
20 15 20    
Note: the values presented in columns 1–3 are the percentages of respondents who identified a 
particular item as a suggested improvement to UITT. The values displayed in the last three 
columns are Z statistics for differences in proportions between each class of interviewee. 
* P<0.01. 
6. Qualitative findings 
Table 6 demonstrates that licenses and royalties were identified as outputs of UITT by a 
substantial majority of TTO directors and university administrators. Managers and entrepreneurs 
also frequently mentioned licenses, but stressed informal aspects of UITT a bit more, as well as 
economic development outcomes. Scientists emphasized product development and surprisingly, 
failed to mention sponsored research agreements. 
 
Another key finding is that there is considerable heterogeneity in stakeholder perspectives 
regarding UITT outputs. There appears to be a “Rashomon” effect, as evidenced by the 
numerous output categories identified by respondents and by the many significant differences 
between each class of interviewee (16 out of 30 Z statistics are significant at the 5% level).28 
This is perhaps not surprising, as university management of intellectual property through a TTO 
is a recent and somewhat controversial development. 
 
This raises the important issue of the tradeoffs associated with stimulating additional UITT, in 
terms of its impact on the sharing and dissemination of knowledge. Indeed, some interviewees 
perceived the mission of the TTO (protection and marketing of the university’s intellectual 
property) as being inconsistent with the traditional “public domain” philosophy regarding the 
dissemination of information that pervades most research universities. This concern was 
articulated in a recent trenchant essay by Nelson (2001), who asserts that the cost of losing the 
culture of “open science” that exists at leading universities outweighs any benefits that might 
arise as a result of more rapid technological diffusion. 
 
Table 7 shows that respondents in each stakeholder category mentioned personal relationships in 
UITT much more often than contractual relationships. One scientist said: 
 
I would say right now that I feel that the one-on-one interaction is somewhat more 
successful in effectively transferring technology [than is research formally sponsored by 
a consortium]. 
 
This raises the possibility that the formation of “social networks” could be important in UITT. 
These networks include academic and industry scientists, graduate students and post-doctoral 
fellows who conduct most of the experimental work in laboratories, former graduate students 
who have accepted positions in industry, entrepreneurs, and perhaps, university administrators 
and TTO directors. As defined by Liebeskind et al. (1996), social networks, like markets, involve 
exchanges between legally distinct entities. However, unlike markets, social networks support 
these exchanges without using competitive pricing or legal contracting. Instead, they rely on 
shared norms among the exchange partners, where information is the currency of exchange.29 
Table 7 also indicates that knowledge transfer appears to work in both directions. For instance, 
65% of the scientists noted that interacting with industry has had a positive influence on their 
experimental work. Some scientists explicitly mentioned that these interactions improved the 
quantity and quality of their basic research. A representative comment from a scientist was: 
 
There is no doubt that working with industry scientists has made me a better researcher. 
They help me refine my experiments and sometimes have a different perspective on a 
problem that sparks my own ideas. Also, my involvement with firms has allowed me to 
purchase better equipment for my lab, which means I can conduct more experiments. 
 
This result is consistent with Zucker and Darby (1996), who found an increase in the scholarly 
output of “star” academic scientists after they were involved in commercialization efforts in 
biotechnology.30 This implies that the conventional wisdom regarding the existence of a tradeoff 
between UITT activity and research performance may be wrong. 
As shown in Table 8, all three groups identified a lack of understanding regarding 
university/corporate/scientific norms as a barrier to effective UITT (90.0, 93.3, and 75.0%). It 
appears that these cultural and informational barriers are pervasive. That is, university scientists 
and administrators often do not understand or appreciate the industry environment, and vice 
versa. An illustrative comment from a scientist was: 
 
Industry has a lack of understanding of what an academic institution does and a lack of 
understanding of what a university faculty member’s responsibility is to their institution. 
There are some companies I don’t even deal with because their approach to dealing with 
an academic entity is so poor. They feel that basically we owe them by our position at the 
university because the state pays our salaries. 
 
Our qualitative evidence is consistent with the view that UITT stakeholders operate under 
different organizational environments and cultures, implying that they have different norms, 
standards, and values. For example, Nelson (2001) noted how universities and firms differ in 
their perspective on the role of knowledge. Managers and entrepreneurs usually do not share the 
academic values of publishing results and sharing information with colleagues and the general 
public. Instead, new knowledge and technology is to be kept proprietary and exploited to achieve 
or sustain a competitive advantage. 
Table 8 also indicates widespread belief that there are insufficient rewards for faculty 
involvement in UITT. Sixty percent of administrators and 70% of scientists reported this as a 
barrier. In their comments, administrators and scientists specifically referred to tenure and 
promotion policies and the university’s royalty and equity distribution formula. The latter refers 
to the split in licensing or equity income among the inventor(s), the department or college of the 
inventor(s), and the TTO or another general research fund within the university. For example, at 
one school, the formula was 40% inventor, 40% inventor’s department, and 20% “invention 
management fund” which is managed by the TTO.31 An administrator at a school with a 
relatively low payout rate to inventors noted that: 
 
Some faculty members have complained about the low share of revenue they receive. 
They may be right. We hope to bring that up to say 40% in the near future. I think we’ll 
have much of a struggle on that one. 
 
The vast majority of interviewees also specifically commented on the fact that tenure and 
promotion decisions continued to be made almost strictly on the basis of publications and grants. 
For example, one scientist remarked: 
 
Technology transfer has not played a role in the performance evaluation process. 
Performance evaluation is based on publications. 
 
From this scientist’s perspective, the existing reward structure at his university is inconsistent 
with the organizational objective of increasing UITT, a goal that is featured prominently in that 
university’s mission statement and promotional brochures. 
Managers/entrepreneurs (80%) and scientists (70%) also frequently pointed to university 
bureaucracy and inflexibility as barriers to effective UITT. Many scientists and managers 
provided us with examples of rigid, cumbersome, and unclear policies and procedures that 
impede UITT. Faculty members who had tried to form startup companies were especially vocal 
on this point. A typical remark from a scientist was: 
 
I don’t think they understand the flexibility within the framework and what they can do. I 
think they have a set of forms and a set of ways of doing things, and if it doesn’t fit nicely 
into that, then they make you go through a whole bunch of hoops. 
 
Although some of these complaints may be self-serving, universities that wish to enhance UITT 
productivity should address such negative perceptions. 
 
Staffing practices in the TTO are also a matter of concern. Recall that a university technology 
licensing officer is responsible for coordinating the activities that result in a formal agreement 
between the university (and its scientists) and a firm. Fifty-five percent of the managers and 
entrepreneurs we interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the marketing and negotiation skills 
of TTO personnel. An intellectual property manager stated: 
 
These guys (TTOs) need to be marketing facilitators rather than lawyers. They need to be 
able to step into the company and into their customer’s shoes and look back. 
 
A lack of requisite business skills and expertise could have a significant deleterious effect on 
TTO productivity. Other respondents noted that TTOs are either too narrowly focused on a small 
set of technical areas, or too concerned with the legal aspects of licensing. 
There is also a strong belief on the part of industry (80%) that universities are exercising their 
intellectual property rights too aggressively. One manager stated: 
 
I think the frustration for commercial licensees who go to a university is that it seems as 
though the attitude they are hitting at the university is ‘oh we’ve got this wonderful thing 
and we’re going to drag every nickel out of you that we can get for it’. 
 
One interpretation of this perception is that it is self-serving and merely a reflection of the 
inherently adversarial nature of negotiations. However, this attitude, in conjunction with the 
concerns raised earlier regarding university bureaucracy and inflexibility, has led some firms to 
completely avoid working with TTOs. Thus, when an invention is publicly disclosed, some firms 
will contact scientists and arrange to work with them via informal technology transfer, through 
consulting or a sabbatical leave. A scientist reported on the attitude of firms he was working 
with: 
 
In fact a lot of firms will come to us and say we don’t want to go through the university 
… we’ll just pay you on the side. 
 
Table 9 presents some suggested improvements to the UITT process. These recommendations 
are fairly consistent with the impediments identified in Table 8. With virtual unanimity, 
respondents suggested that universities and firms should devote more effort to developing better 
mutual understanding. Several respondents noted that this could easily be achieved through such 
events as “Town Hall” meetings involving the three stakeholder groups, as well as by targeting 
each individual group with additional information to help facilitate UITT. For example, one 
university scientist pointed out that new faculty orientations at his university did not include a 
module on UITT issues: 
It’s appalling that new faculty members don’t receive any information on how to get 
involved in technology transfer at their orientation sessions. What does that tell you about 
this school’s priorities? 
 
Another consistent theme was that universities should align reward systems with UITT goals. 
Although we lack measures of the intensity of feeling on a particular theme, our analysis of the 
transcripts reveals that recommendations regarding changes in reward systems were by far the 
most direct and vivid of the suggested improvements to the UITT process. Many university 
administrators specifically mentioned the need to reward UITT more in promotion and tenure 
decisions. One department chair phrased it as follows: 
 
It’s the height of hypocrisy for universities to claim that they value technology transfer, 
or that it’s supposed to be a top institutional priority, and then fail to reward it in their 
promotion and tenure decisions. At some point, we’ve got to resolve this discrepancy. 
 
Several managers/entrepreneurs and administrators also discussed the need for incentive 
compensation for TTO staff. A representative comment from a manager was: 
 
The TTO people need to push the deals through …. You’ve got to look at how they are 
rewarded. Perhaps if they were paid on the basis of the number of deals they complete or 
the revenue they generate for the university, you would see more technologies licensed. I 
guess that they are so terrified of negative publicity if a bad deal goes through, that 
they’re afraid to make this change. 
 
Our respondents noted that some private schools, and even some public ones, such as the 
University of Washington and Wayne State, recently instituted incentive compensation plans in 
the TTO. Other schools are contemplating implementing these programs. Such efforts might 
reduce the high rate of turnover among TTO staff and enhance productivity.32 
Table 9 also demonstrates that, to a lesser extent, there was support for the notion that 
universities should devote additional resources to UITT, although most of these 
recommendations were somewhat nebulous. Many respondents also suggested that universities 
provide more education and/or community outreach to overcome informational and cultural 
barriers. A predictable recommendation from managers and entrepreneurs is that universities 
should be less aggressive in exercising intellectual property rights. 
 
7. Conclusions and suggestions for additional research 
In this paper, we present quantitative and qualitative evidence on several aspects of UITT. A 
stochastic production function framework is used to assess the relative productivity of university 
TTOs. The parameter estimates of the stochastic frontier imply that licensing activity, our proxy 
for UITT, is characterized by constant returns to scale. The deviations from the frontier, which 
represent technical inefficiency, are assumed to be a function of a vector of environmental and 
institutional factors. We find that these variables explain a portion of the variation in relative 
productivity across universities. 
 
We hypothesize that some of the remaining variation in relative efficiency can be attributed to 
organizational practices in university management of intellectual property. Unfortunately, this 
hypothesis cannot be formally tested because there are no systematic measures of these factors. 
Thus, an analysis of UITT organizational practices is fertile ground for an inductive, exploratory 
field study. As a first step towards identifying these practices, we conducted 55 face-to-face 
interviews of 98 key UITT stakeholders at five research universities. This fieldwork also greatly 
improved our ability to model the UITT process, by providing a critical reality check on the 
specification of the econometric model. Based on our qualitative evidence, we believe that the 
most critical organizational factors are reward systems for faculty involvement in UITT, 
compensation and staffing practices in the TTO, and actions taken by administrators to extirpate 
informational and cultural barriers between universities and firms. More specifically, it appears 
that the propensity of faculty members to disclose inventions, and thus, increase the “supply” of 
technologies available for commercialization, will be related to promotion and tenure policies 
and the university’s royalty and equity distribution formula. TTO compensation practices could 
also be relevant because UITT activity will depend on the efforts of technology licensing officers 
to elicit invention disclosures and market them effectively to private companies. Thus, we expect 
that, ceteris paribus, licensing activity will be higher at universities that have implemented some 
form of incentive compensation plan for technology licensing officers.33 
 
Staffing practices in the TTO may also help explain why some universities are more proficient 
than others in managing intellectual property. According to Parker and Zilberman (1993), TTOs 
usually hire either a mix of scientists and lawyers or a mix of scientists and 
entrepreneurs/businessmen. In the former case, legal functions, such as the adjudication of 
disputes involving intellectual property rights and the negotiation of licensing agreements, are 
performed in-house. In the latter case, such functions are usually outsourced. Parker and 
Zilberman hypothesize that the entrepreneur/business model for TTOs may be more conducive to 
helping scientists form their own startups. It also seems reasonable to assume that TTOs staffed 
in this manner would be more effective in the marketing phase of UITT. A substantial percentage 
of managers suggested that universities hire more licensing professionals with stronger 
marketing and business skills. 
 
Our findings regarding informational and cultural barriers suggest that “boundary spanning” 
could be an important skill for university technology licensing officers. Boundary spanning 
behavior has been studied extensively in the management literature (Katz and Tushman, 1983). 
In the context of UITT, boundary spanning refers to actions taken by university technology 
managers to serve as a bridge between “customers” (entrepreneurs/firms) and “suppliers” 
(scientists), who operate in distinctly different environments. Without effective boundary 
spanning, the needs of customers may not be adequately communicated to suppliers. Similarly, 
the capabilities and interests of suppliers may not be adequately communicated to customers. 
Effective boundary spanning by a TTO would involve adept communication with both 
stakeholder groups, in an effort to forge alliances between scientists and firms. 
 
The most natural extension of our exploratory study would be to survey UITT stakeholders at 
each university in an attempt to measure the organizational factors we have identified.34 Some 
variables, such as the university’s royalty and equity distribution formula are easy to measure 
with a survey and may even be available on the worldwide web. Other variables, such as 
measures of the skills of TTO personnel, tenure and promotion policies, and other policy 
variables will be more perceptual in nature. In designing these surveys, we need to be mindful of 
the considerable heterogeneity in stakeholder perspectives on UITT that was revealed in our 
interviews. This finding underscores the importance of surveying scientists, 
managers/entrepreneurs, and administrators separately to generate a more accurate and unbiased 
view of the organizational environment. 
 
Taking stock of organizational practices in university management of intellectual property will 
be useful in several respects. First, given the somewhat embryonic nature of the TTO enterprise 
as an organizational form, there is a need to simply document the nature of these practices.35 
Many administrators expressed a strong interest in benchmarking their intellectual property 
management practices relative to peer institutions. Perhaps the most important benefit of 
collecting this information is that it can be used to determine the fraction of the variance in 
relative productivity that can be attributed to organizational factors. We can also identify specific 
practices that enhance UITT productivity. Finally, these data could be used to assess the 
performance effects of the adoption of complementary organizational practices. Recent 
theoretical (Athey and Stern, 1998) and empirical (Ichniowski et al., 1997) studies highlight the 
importance of clusters or “mixes” of complementary organizational practices in enhancing 
productivity, due to interaction effects. It would be interesting to see if such synergies arise in the 
context of UITT. 
 
Possible extensions to the econometric analysis include adding more environmental and 
institutional factors as explanatory variables in the inefficiency equation, such as measures of the 
strictness of state and university technology transfer policies, local venture capital activity, and 
more detailed data on regional R&D. It might also be useful to employ a more general, “flexible” 
functional form for the production function, such as the Generalized Leontief specification (see 
Morrison and Siegel, 1997). Access to more comprehensive data might also allow for an analysis 
of variation in licensing practices and impediments by technology field (e.g. physical versus life 
sciences).36 Another extension to the empirical analysis would involve incorporating multiple 
outputs of UITT, such as the number of startups and sponsored research agreements resulting 
from UITT. This requires the use of a “distance” function approach, which has been 
implemented in recent studies in the stochastic frontier literature.37 
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1 For instance, as noted in Cohen et al. (1998), NSF has established Science and Technology 
Centers and other programs that require universities to attract matching funds from industry. See 
David and Hall (2000), Klette et al. (2000), and Martin and Scott (2000) for more general 
theoretical and empirical considerations of public–private partnerships in the realm of R&D. 
2 Gallini and Scotchmer (2001) provides an excellent discussion of issues related to appropriate 
intellectual property regimes in this context. 
3 See Geroski (2000) for an excellent review article of models of technology diffusion. 
4 “We came to the realization that this failure to move from abstract research into useful 
commercial innovation was largely a result of the government’s patent policy and we sought to 
draft legislation which would change this policy in a way to quickly and directly stimulate the 
development and commercialization of inventions” (Bayh, 1996). 
5 Mowery et al. (2001) challenge this causal interpretation of the impact of Bayh–Dole on UITT. 
The authors analyze pre- and post-Bayh–Dole UITT licensing and patenting at the University of 
California, Columbia, and Stanford, and conclude that Bayh–Dole was only one of several 
factors inducing a rise in UITT. 
6 Exceptions are papers by Thursby and Thursby (2000) and Bercovitz et al. (2001). The former 
is a quanitative study, based on AUTM data, which examines the productivity of university 
licensing. The latter is a qualitative study of the relationship between organizational structure and 
UITT performance at Duke, Johns Hopkins, and Penn State. 
7 Also, university technology managers tend to view patents as both an input and output of UITT 
(see AUTM, 1997, pp. 20–21). 
8 This amount includes expenditures in support of prosecution, maintenance, litigation, and 
interference costs relating to patents and/or copyrights (see AUTM, 1997). 
9 Battese and Coelli (1995) have recently extended this model to incorporate panel data. 
10 An alternative is to use MSA-level R&D data on industrial innovations and R&D 
employment, provided in Anselin et al. (1997). Unfortunately, these data (from 1982) do not 
correspond to our sample period. 
11 Source: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching—to qualify for Research 1 
status, a university must award 50 or more doctoral degrees and receive at least US$ 40 million 
annually in federal research grants. 
12 Unfortunately, AUTM does not ask TTOs to split out information on exclusive and non-
exclusive licenses. 
13 Source: NSF (1991) Research and Development in Industry (1991–1996), US BEA (1999) 
Gross State Product data reported in Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth. 
14 A similar problem is encountered with patents. Jaffe et al. (1993), Trajtenberg et al. (1997), 
and Henderson et al. (1998) weight patents on the basis of the number of citations they receive. 
15 Although there is no direct diagnostic test for multi-collinearity, we do not observe any of the 
key symptoms of this problem: (1) high R2 but few significant t ratios; (2) high pairwise and 
partial correlations among explanatory variables (see Table 2). Thus, we conclude that there does 
not appear to be a multi-collinearity problem. 
16 Coelli (1994) points out that, except for the intercept term, the OLS estimates are consistent, 
albeit inefficient. 
17 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this salient point. 
18 That is, the mean technical efficiency is closer to one when we include these variables in the 
stochastic frontier model (0.06/(1−0.77)=0.261 and 0.04/(1−0.76)=0.167). 
19 This is by no means an exhaustive list of such concerns. For a comprehensive review of 
qualitative research methods, see Miles and Huberman, 1994 and Yin, 1989. 
20 That is, some institutions are close to the frontier, while others are highly inefficient. 
21 Although there were only 55 face-to-face meetings, we actually interviewed 100 individuals, 
since multiple respondents were present at some meetings (Siegel et al., 2001). 
22 Typically, the TTO director reports to a Vice President, Vice Provost, or Vice Chancellor for 
Research. 
23 In one region, a facilitator had published a voluminous report on UITT, which contained the 
names, phone numbers, and addresses of these potential respondents. 
24 Five professors (two management professors and three economists) conducted the 55 
interviews (Siegel, 1999). 
25 According to Yin (1989), this serves two useful purposes. First, it indicates the researchers’ 
concern and respect for the value of the respondent’s time. Second, it reduces uncertainty and 
suspicion regarding the intentions of the researchers. 
26 We also followed the advice of Miles and Huberman (1994) by having multiple assessors of 
interview transcripts. The authors assert that the use of multiple assessors reduces the degree of 
bias in interpreting such transcripts. 
27 These methods are similar to those employed by Butterfield et al. (1996), who identified 
unique “thought units” pertinent to their subject of interest (employee discipline). 
28 For the benefit of Research Policy readers who are cinematically deprived, Rashomon is a 
famous Japanese movie, directed by Akira Kurosawa. It portrays four vastly different views of 
the same heinous crime. In coining this phrase, we wish to suggest that the three stakeholders 
(academic scientists, university administrators, and managers/entrepreneurs) may have starkly 
different perspectives on the same events/process. 
29 Powell (1990) argued that social networks are the most efficient organizational arrangement 
for sourcing information because information is difficult to price and communicate through a 
hierarchical structure. 
30 Mansfield (1995) reported similar results for a variety of scientific fields. 
31 Jensen and Thursby (2001) surveyed 62 TTOs and found that the mean payout rate to 
inventors is 40%. See Beath et al., 2000 for an analysis of the optimal payout rate for scientists. 
32 Several firms were frustrated by the high rate of turnover in the TTO, which was perceived to 
be detrimental to relationship building and organizational learning. 
33 Lazear (1999) and Ichniowski et al. (1997) report a positive correlation between incentive 
compensation and worker and plant productivity, respectively. 
34 There is an existing survey instrument to measure boundary-spanning skills (Caldwell and 
O’Reilly, 1982). 
35 Although TTOs were established many years ago at some elite institutions, our discussion 
relates to TTOs at more representative universities. 
36 In this regard, Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) report some interesting differences in the 
perceptions of academics in the physical and life sciences regarding patent outcomes. 
37 As described in Grosskopf et al. (1997), this class of models assumes that the relationship 
between output and inputs can be represented by a transformation function T, where 0=T(x,y) 
and y denotes a vector of outputs (0=y−f(x) for the single output case). 
